U.S. sources, meanwhile, reported on August 12 that the Soviets had up to 1,000 military advisers who were indeed still assisting the Iraqi army.2 Two days later the Defense Ministry denied Soviet advisers were helping either "the Iraqi President or the armed forces," but talked of their work on "repairs, education and construction. In the end Moscow did indeed sustain its general commitment to all U.N. resolutions on Iraq, but only with a process that proved deeply unsettling within the Soviet Union. It had a treaty of friendship and co-operation with Saddam Hussein's regime, and for two decades it had trained the Iraqi military, supplying it with billions of dollars worth of weaponry and equipment. Thousands of Iraqi communists vanished into the dungeons of the security forces. Shevardnadze's departure was one more important trophy for right-wing forces seeking to eliminate those responsible for the hemorrhage of traditional Soviet interests abroad and the loss of party power at home.The right was not without tactical allies as well. A joint statement the very next day sharply condemned Iraq and called for an immediate cutoff of military equipment to Baghdad. And it occasionally acted as an intermediary between Iraq and the West, helping to enforce U.N. Security Council resolutions on Kuwait and Iraqi disarmament. The joint Soviet-American approach rested on a belief in principles and interests common to both sides. "President Saddam's coming to power was accompanied by an unprecedented campaign to physically annihilate any dissidence, let alone any potential shouts of opposition. Shevardnadze had quickly established basic Soviet policy before any other elements of the government had the opportunity to reconsider or react.
Thoughtful Soviet observers could also not exclude the possibility that the war could well unleash dangerous regional effects: the collapse and possible breakup of Iraq, conflict between Turkey and Iran over the remnants, resurgent Kurdish nationalism, potential separatism in Iranian Azerbaijan and Kurdistan and ignition of volatile separatist urges in the Muslim states of the Soviet Union itself.It is clear that the Soviet military was institutionally more at odds with stated Soviet policy than any other group. After all, U.S. weaponry was not only pitted against a former Soviet military ally and long-term recipient of Soviet military training, but against Soviet weaponry-on the losing side.
Indeed, for many it was not a question of whether to support Washington, but a question of degree. At several points in the crisis it was uncertain just how firmly Moscow's principles of "new thinking" in foreign policy would hold. In the end it opted not to, on several grounds: concern about the safety of its citizens working in Iraq-a potentially explosive domestic issue; the implications for long-range Soviet ties with Iraq; memories of the Afghan imbroglio and a desire to avoid excessive identification with the growing ambition of U.S. war plans. Although Russia did not commit troops, it joined the United States in condemning Iraq, its long-time client state. But, desperate for success in deteriorating domestic circumstances, he also hoped to attain dramatic diplomatic gains as mediator in the gulf. The U.S.S.R. had long been a close ally of Baghdad. Get in-depth analysis delivered right to your inbox Confusion and conflict reigned over their number, mission and the date of their possible departure. Under pressure from the right to dissociate the Soviet Union from distasteful American policies, and to enhance his flagging position internationally and at home, Gorbachev sought repeatedly to weaken the thrust of American war tactics and bring an early end to the fighting. Soviet Muslims were unhappy with the situation. The new world order was fine, but to what place did it relegate the Soviet Union? Gorbachev even stated that the Soviet Union bore special responsibility for the invasion, since Iraq employed weapons provided over many years by the U.S.S.R. for defensive purposes.
The views expressed are his own. Even many liberals grew uncomfortable with the destruction visited upon Iraq. From Moscow's perspective the United States was interpreting U.N. Security Council authority to fit its own purposes, carrying the operation in directions disquieting to Soviet policy goals. He once again propounded a willingness to cooperate with Washington and the United Nations in support of newly found common interests, in stark counterpoise to traditional Soviet postures in the Third World. Graham E. Fuller is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and former Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the Central Intelligence Agency. They added, however, that the advisers were not involved in planning the invasion of Kuwait.4 Soviet spokesmen later stated the advisers would be coming home as soon as their contracts were fulfilled.A distinct Ministry of Defense agenda was revealed in the conflict. In the spring of 1991 he noted that the eclipse of the U.S.S.R. as a superpower would for at least a decade lead to a unipolar world, one in which the United States could work its will unhampered on the international scene. Since then, Russia has endeavoured to maintain a level of influence in the region. Throughout the 1990s, Russia engaged in shuttle diplomacy to try to lift allied sanctions against Iraq.
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